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Justice Blackmun and the "World Out There"
Harold Hongju Koh t
Harry Blackmun fooled everyone. When Richard Nixon appointed him to
the Supreme Court at age sixty-one, who would have predicted that this "'safe"
conservative would retire twenty-four years later-the year Nixon died-as the
Court's last liberal?' Would anyone have guessed how sharply he would break
from his "Minnesota Twin," Warren Burger, or brake the Burger Court's
retreat from the Warren Court? Did an), foresee that a member of so many
majorities2 would someday emerge as the Carolene Products' Justice of the
Rehnquist Court: the spokesman for the have-nots, the excluded, the discrete
and insular minorities?4
Why Blackmun changed has offered steady fare for pundits, but no longer
presents a true puzzle. Part of the explanation. as the Justice himself noted, is
that the Court itself listed rightward.f The Court he joined ranked among the
most liberal in history, while the one he leaves surely stands among the most
conservative.6 In many areas, his jurisprudence remained strikingly consistent
- Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Director, Or'tile H Schell.
Jr., Center for International Human Rights. Yale University; Law, Clerk to Justice Blackmun. October Term
1981. This Tribute grows out of Harold Hongju Koh. Justice Done. N Y TIMEs. Apr 8. 1994. at A27. and
shares thoughts with a forthcoming tribute in 1994 Journal of Suprene Court Htstori
I. Nixon chose Blackmun as his third choice to fill Abe Fortas" seat. onl, after the Senate had balked
at Nixon's "Southern strategy" of nominating first Clement F. Ha%nsworth. Jr and then G Harrold
Carswell. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG. THiE BRETiRFN. ISIDE Tilt St PRL%1it COt RT
56-57, 74-75, 86-88 (1979).
2. See John R. Waltz. Tire Burger/Blackmun Court, N Y. TMES. Dec 6. 1970. § 6 tMagazmc. at 61
(dubbing Blackmun a "White Anglo-Saxon Protestant Republican Rotarian Hars ard Man from the
Suburbs").
3. Compare United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.. 304 US 144. 152 n4 (19381 i"Nor need we
enquire ... whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ma) be a spctal condition. s hich
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquir) - tith Graham
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365. 372 (1971) (Blackmun. J.) ("Aliens as a class are a prime example of a *discrete
and insular minority' . . . for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate ") (citation unittedi
and Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. I. 23 (1982) (Blackmun. I. concumng) ("[The fact that altens
constitutionally may be-and generally are-formally and completely barred from participating in the
process of self-govemment makes particularly profound the need for searching judicial rc'. ics, of
classifications grounded on alienage.").
4. See Pamela S. Karlan. Bringing Compassion into the Province of Judging Justice Blatkmun and
tire Outsiders, 97 DICK. L. REV. 527 (1993); see also Dan T. Cocnen. Justice Blac kmun. Federahsmn and
Separation of Powers. 97 DICK. L. REV. 541. 559-63 (1993) (discusstng Blackmun's role as representation-
reinforcing judge1.
5. Fred Barbash & Al Kamen. Blackrnun Says "'Wlearv' Court Is Sining Right. WASt1t POST. Sept
20, 1984. at Al.
6. In 1970, Blackmun. Burger, and the second Justice Harlan formed the right ssing of a Court that
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during his near-quarter century on the Court: the treatment of aliens,7 women,
Native Americans, and prisoners, 8 church-state relations and affirmative
action,9 just to name a few. In other areas-the right to privacy,"0 law and
medicine," retroactivity," commercial speech, 13 and state taxation, 4 for
example-Blackmun pioneered the Court's governing doctrine, and
subsequently never wavered.
Even so, as Blackmun grew more comfortable on the Court, his voice
undeniably grew bolder and more distinctive. Although his personality did not
change, his sense of role evolved. When he first came to Washington in 1970,
Blackmun seemed the classic insider. A professional lifetime spent at Harvard
College and Law School, the elite Dorsey law firm of Minneapolis, the Mayo
Clinic, and the Eighth Circuit had exposed him to healthy institutions and
responsible professionals. The experience imbued him with an idealistic, almost
naive, faith in government and institutions. In early opinions, he deferred easily
to governmental authority and seemed out of touch with common problems. 5
But Blackmun took his job seriously and did his own work. The Court's
sprawling docket exposed him to a broader, more brutal slice of life than he
had ever known. The relentless cascade of arguments, briefs, prisoner petitions,
death sentences, and daily mail-all of which he read-painted a less tranquil
picture: an America of antagonistic classes, racial conflict, governmental errors,
and intense personal suffering. From the Court, he wrote, "[o]ne sees what
people ... are litigating about .... One gets a sense of their desires and their
frustrations, of their hopes and their disappointments, of their profound
included liberals Hugo Black, William Brennan, William 0. Douglas, and Thurgood Marshall and centrists
Potter Stewart and Byron White. The "conservative" Blackmun of those days would have sat at the center
of any Court that included Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas.
7. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blacknun and the Equal
Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51 (1985).
8. See Karlan, supra note 4, at 529-32 (reviewing cases).
9. See Herman Schwartz, Justice Blackmun, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 737, 741-44 (1994) (reviewing
religion and affirmative action decisions); see also Penda D. Hair, Justice Blackinun and Racial Justice,
104 YALE L.J. 7, 14-19 (1994) (reviewing affirmative action decisions).
10. See Diane P. Wood, Justice Blackmun and Individual Rights, 97 DICK. L. REV. 421, 422-28
(1993) (reviewing privacy cases); see also Randall P. Bezanson, Emancipation as Freedom in Roe v. Wade,
97 DICK. L. REV. 485 (1993).
11. See Harold Hongju Koh, Rebalancing the Medical Triad: Justice Blackmun's Contributions to Law
and Medicine, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 315 (1987); Alan A. Stone, Justice Blackmun: A Survey of His
Decisions in Psychiatry and Law, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 291 (1987).
12. See Coenen, supra note 4, at 550 n.48 (reviewing cases).
13. See Karen Nelson Moore, Justice Blackinun's Contributions on the Court: The Commercial Speech
and State Taxation Examples, 8 HAMLtNE L. REV. 29, 31-43 (1985); William S. Dodge, Balancing With
Bite: Justice Blackmun's Commercial Speech and Public Forum Opinions (Sept. 23, 1994) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
14. See Moore, supra note 13, at 43-49.
15. See. e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upholding $50 bankruptcy filing fee against
equal protection claim by indigent); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 759 (1971)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (voting for government in Pentagon Papers case); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S,
309 (1971) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to New York law conditioning welfare benefits on in-
home visits by caseworkers).
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personal concerns, and of what they regard as important and as crucial....
We see .. a constant, seething economic, domestic, and ethical struggle.""i
Cases like Roe i. Wade 7 and Furman v. Georgia" subjected him to "an
excruciating agony of the spirit.""' Roe, in particular, won him passionate
admiration and vicious harassment. "Think of any name," he once recalled,
"I've been called it ... : Butcher of Dachau, murderer, Pontius Pilate, Adolph
Hitler.-20 In public places, he was picketed and embraced, threatened and
celebrated, and once literally fired upon, in his own living room. These searing
experiences taught him that Justices have no choice but to take sides, and to
bear the consequences. He began to realize that all social institutions are not
equally responsible, and that in the face of institutional abuse, well-meaning
deference can amount to unconscionable abdication. By 1992, Blackmun saw
the world in different tones. Asked what he had learned on the Supreme Court,
he answered: "That feet today indeed are made of clay, and that there seems
to be an element of larceny and of the unethical in so many people in public
life; that life is or can be cruel; that man's inhumanity to man still prevails;
that life itself is controversy; and that we still are a racist society deep down
in the core of our being.'
Blackmun's awakening forced him to rethink his judicial role. Muted
leitmotifs in his earlier thinking recurred and intensified. Asked at his 1970
confirmation hearing about his "views of the Supreme Court as the protector
of our basic liberties," Blackmun answered: '[Mly record and the opinions that
I have written ... will show, particularly in the civil rights area and in ... the
treatment of little people, what I hope is a sensitivity to their problems."22
Working amid the Court's sheltered splendor, surrounded by words and
abstractions, Blackmun came to see "another world *out there,"' that the Court
"either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize."2 In that world, he realized,
antagonism and not altruism dominates. Lessons that Thurgood Marshall
learned through bitter experience, Blackmun grasped through human empathy
and sheer hard work. "[W]here a presumed majority . . . punitively impresses
upon a needy minority its own concepts of the socially desirable, the publicly
acceptable, and the morally sound, with a touch of the devil-take-the-
16. Harry A. Blackmun, Remarks at the Commencement Etercises of Maso Medi al School. 55 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 573, 573-74 (1980).
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
19. Id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
20. John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun. N.Y TIMES. Fcb 20. 1983. § 6
(Magazine), at 20, 26 (quoting Justice Blackmun).
21. Harry A. Blackmun. Address at the 69th Annual Dinner of the American Law Institutc (May 14.
1992). in AMERICAN LAW INSTITrTF REMARKS AND ADDRESSES AT TIlE 69rni AN't At, M.IMNG 47.
47-48 (1992) [hereinafter ALt Address].
22. Nomination of Harry A. Blacknun. of Minnesota. to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Conun. on the Judictr.. 91 st Cong. 2d Ses% 37 (1 970)
(testimony of Hon. Harry A. Blackmun) Ihereinafter Confirmation Hrarngl.
23. Beal v. Doe. 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun. J. dissenting).
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hindmost," he wrote in 1977, "It]his is not the kind of thing for which our
Constitution stands."'24 Judges, he began to argue, should construe the
Constitution "as a force that would serve justice to all evenhandedly and, in
so doing .... better the lot of the poorest among us." 5 When interpreting
grandly worded constitutional provisions, Blackmun insisted, the Court should
"adopt a 'sympathetic' reading, one which comports with the dictates of
fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from
the province of judging. 26
As Blackmun's sense of his judicial role crystallized, so too did his
willingness to rethink old positions. "[I]n law," he wrote as a circuit judge,
"there is constant movement. We should be aware of this, anticipate it, and not
resent it."'27 "As times have changed," he testified at his Supreme Court
confirmation hearing, "Justices have changed. People take a second look."2s
Relentlessly open-minded, during his tenure on the Court, Blackmun began to
revisit old votes and to reexamine early views.
Federalism, separation of powers, and the death penalty were but three
areas in which Blackmun took another look. After casting a tentative deciding
vote for the majority's position in National League of Cities v. Usery,
29
Blackmun watched and reflected, then wrote the opinion that interred that
decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.3" Although
he joined the Court's sweeping rejection of the legislative veto in INS v.
Chadha,3' the rigid logic of that decision's separation-of-powers reasoning
gave him pause,32 and ultimately led him to uphold the federal sentencing
guidelines under a "flexible understanding of separation of powers" in
Mistretta v. United States. 33 In his final term, after years of "vot[ing] to
enforce the death penalty," while publicly "doubt[ing] its moral, social, and
constitutional legitimacy," he found himself "morally and intellectually
obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed."
' 4
To be sure, in each of these areas, Blackmun changed. In each, however, his
24. Id. at 462-63.
25. Id. at 463.
26. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
27. Harry A. Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in § 2255 and Habeas Corpus
Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343, 359 (1967).
28. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 22, at 43.
29. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (creating Tenth Amendment immunity for "traditional governmental
functions" of states); see also id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
30. 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities' "traditional governmental
functions" test as "not only unworkable but ... inconsistent with established principles of federalism").
31. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
32. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,776-77 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing "that
'executive' powers of the kind delegated to the Comptroller General under the Deficit Control Act need
not be exercised by an officer who serves at the President's pleasure").
33. 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989).
34. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 & n.] (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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"second look" was the more probing and revealing. In none was his turnabout
abrupt or capricious. In each, he changed only after studying the doctrine's
impact on society and realizing he could no longer pretend "that the desired
level of fairness has been achieved" once and for all time."
Although detractors deemed him undisciplined, guided by "sentimentalism"
and "compassion" over hard-headed reason, 6  these critics confused
emotionalism with candor, doctrinal wavering with maturing judgment. Change
and growth are not the same. As Judge Richard Arnold has noted, "Especially
in matters of constitutional interpretation, it may be more important to be right
than to be consistent, and Justice Blackmun has been unremitting in his pursuit
of what is right." 37 "Judgment, judgment, judgment," Blackmun himself
wrote. "It grows by experience and it grows by learning."35 That credo led
him to constancy when warranted, change when times demanded. "Revolted"
by stare decisis for its own sake,39 he asked. "Must our law be so rigid and
our procedural concepts so inflexible that we render ourselves helpless when
the existing methods and the traditional concepts do not quite fit ... new
issues?"40 Sometimes. he adjusted to modern social realities simply by
recognizing the obvious: that "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first
take account of race"; 41 that "[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the
home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and
the world of ideas"; 42 and that Bowers v. Hardwick was a case not about "'a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,' but "about . .. 'the right
35. Id. at 1128. A quarter-century earlier, as a circuit judge, Blackmun had declared that he %%as "not
convinced of the rightness of capital punishment as a deterrent in crme " Confirmation Hearing. supra note
22, at 59; see Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138. 153-54 (8th Cir. 1968). vacated and remanded. 398 U S
262 (1970); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238. 405 (1972) (Blackmun. J. dissnting) ("I )idd to
no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and. indeed. abhorrence, for the death penalt) "'. Lynn
E. Blais, Simple JusticelSimple Murder: Reflections on Judicial Atodestv Federal Habeas amd Justice
Blackmtun's Capital Punishment Jurisprudence. 97 DicK. L. REV 513 (1993) tre% aete ng Blackmun's death-
penalty jurisprudence): William J. Brennan. Jr.. Neither lictrtus Nor E.ecutoners. 8 NOTRE DAIE I L
ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 1. 1-4 (1994) (examining current state of Court's vaess on death penalty). cf
Coenen, supra note 4, at 551-52 (tracing evolution of Blackmun's views on separation of powers). Martha
A. Field. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of A Misguided Doctrine. 99
HARV. L. REV. 84 (1985) (tracing evolution of Blackmun's and the Court's view~s on Tenth Amendment)
36. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen. Sentimental Journer, NEW REPtUBLIC. May 2. 1994. at 13. Stuart Taslor.
Jr.. Justice Blackmun's Jurisprudence of Compassiot. LEGAL, TmIMEs OF WASII'GTO'5. Apr II. 1994. at
26.
37. Richard S. Arnold, Justice Harry Blacknun: Some Personal Notes. 43 A't U L RE 699. 703
(1994).
38. Harry A. Blackmun. Some Goals for Legal Educatian. 1 0111 N U L REV 403. 408 11974)
39. "Like Justice Holmes, I believe that *lilt is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of la%% than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." Bowers % Hardwick. 478 U S 186. 199 t1986)
(Blackmun. J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
40. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727. 755-56 (1972) (Blackmun. J . dissenting), see also Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.. 458 U.S, 419, 455 (1983) (Blackmun. J. dissentng) (criticizing
majority's "archaic judicial response to a modem social problem")
41. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 265. 407 (1978) (separate opinion of Blackmun.
J.).
42. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975)
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most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone."' 43
Blackmun retired in a characteristic act of self-discipline, saying simply,
"[I]t's time."" Yet as his farewell contribution to this journal reveals,45 even
as he retired, he was still growing and learning. When he spoke of the other
"world out there," Blackmun meant, of course, the other America, the world
inhabited by the poor, the alien, the minority, the child. But increasingly, his
sensitivity to difference led him to another kind of understanding as well: of
the world beyond our borders and law's role in it. In the years ahead, this
overlooked, international facet of Blackmun's jurisprudence will form an
increasingly prominent part of his judicial legacy.
Blackmun approached the task of understanding international law, like all
he faced, with diligence and thoroughness. Trained as a corporate lawyer, he
instinctively grasped the impact of legal rules on transnational business
practices. 6 Like his fellow "internationalist" Justice, William 0. Douglas, he
traveled widely while on the Court. 7 On several occasions, he taught and
defended the American constitutional system to foreign lawyers, 48 and in
annual sessions on "International Justice," he grappled with the limits of law
in a world of power politics. 9 A historian by temperament," he revisited
the first principles underlying the foreign affairs power and the role of
43. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing majority opinion and Olmstead v,
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
44. Statements by Blackmun and Clinton on Retiring, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at A24 (remarks of
Justice Blackmun).
45. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39 (1994).
46. See. e.g., Socirt6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522,
548 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling majority's view "of this
country's international obligations ... particularly unfortunate in a world in which regular commercial and
legal channels loom ever more crucial"); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (upholding international arbitration clause of agreement in light of "need of the
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes"); Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (developing rules of in personam jurisdiction in transnational
business setting); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (developing Court's foreign
commerce clause test in state tax cases).
47. Over the years Blackmun traveled to places as far afield as Aix-en-Provence. Berlin, England,
Haiti, Ireland, Israel, Paris, Rome, and Salzburg. Interview with Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Washington,
D.C. (Sept. 16, 1994); see David H. Souter, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 104 YALE L.J. 5, 5
(1994) ("[Slince I've known him, . . . he has chosen to sally out to deliver probably more speeches than
any of his colleagues."); cf. Jules Lobel, Justice Douglas the Internationalist: The Connection Between
Domestic Liberty and Foreign Policy, in "HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN": THE LEGACY OF
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 279, 279 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990) (chronicling Douglas' travels).
48. See ALl Address, supra note 21, at 49-50 (describing teaching American law to lawyers from
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East) ("[Wle were forced to defend [our legal system], and in any event,
to examine it critically. Perhaps it was not the easiest assignment, but it was for me a worthwhile one.").
49. During 18 summers, Blackmun co-taught a Justice and Society seminar at the Aspen Institute. See
Norval Morris, HAB, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 730 (1994). Materials discussed included, inter alia, the famous
Melian Dialogue in Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War; Stanley Hoffmann's Duties Beyond Borders: On
the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics; and writings of Louis Henkin on International
Human Rights. See THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, SEMINAR READINGS ON JUSTtCE AND SOCIETY 299, 300, 305,
375 (5th ed. 1992).
50. See Karlan, supra note 4, at 533 n.38 (noting Blackmun's inclination toward detailed historical
research).
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"[i]nternational law [as] part of our law."5' During his last judicial decade,
Blackmun drew these strands together into a vision of law's global domain.
Although far from coherent, four themes increasingly run through the
current Court's "global jurisprudence." First, the Court has broadly deferred
to executive power to deal with perceived exigencies, largely unchecked by
individual rights, framework statutes, or judicial oversight." Second, the
Justices have rarely treated treaty or customary international law rules as
meaningful restraints upon U.S. action, often construing them out of context
to permit U.S. actions that plainly offend the underlying purposes of the
international-law norm.53 Third, the Court has paid lip service to international
comity as a reason unilaterally to restrict the scope of U.S. regulation.'
Fourth, the Court has largely refused to look beyond parochial U.S. interests
to the needs of an ordered international system when assessing the legality of
extraterritorial action.55
Taken together, these tenets have empowered the executive branch to act
unilaterally in the international realm, based upon subjective and sometimes
myopic assessments of our national interests. In so acting, U.S. officials have
generally consulted local rules, customs, and cultures, while ignoring
extraterritorial impacts, foreign laws and sensibilities. Congress, our treaty
partners, and other affected nations and nationals have found few meaningful
avenues of protest, as our courts have construed ambiguities in previously
negotiated accords-both interbranch and intergovernmental-to permit the
executive action. Injured individuals have had little recourse, deemed to lack
standing or even rights to challenge arbitrary executive action. The grim result:
a realist world in which Hobbesian obsession with national self-interest trumps
human rights (of citizens, and especially of aliens), democratic decisions, and
the settled expectations that flow from negotiated agreements and shared
norms.
56
51. The Paquete Habana. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). cted in Blackmun. supra note 45. at 40. Compare
Harry A. Blackmun, John Jay and the Federalist Papers. 8 PACE L. REv. 237 (1988) (tracing career of
Ambassador and Chief Justice John Jay) with Blackmun. supra note 45. at 49 ('Modern jurists also are
notably lacking in the diplomatic experience of early Justices such as John Jay and John Marshall. who
were familiar with the law of nations and comfortable navigating by it.").
52. See generally HAROLD HONGJU KOiH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITrION SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CON,,rRA AFFAIR 117-49 (1990) (reviewing cases).
53. See Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm"* in United States Human Rights Poh¢cv. 103 YALE
L.J. 2391, 2413-23 (1994) (reviewing cases).
54. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California. 113 S& Ct. 2891 (1993) (holding that pnnciple of
international comity did not bar district court from exereising Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign
reinsurance claims). See generally Harold Hongju Koh. Transnatonal Public Law Litigation. 100 YALE
L.J. 2347, 2392 (1991) (reviewing "discernible decline in the American deference to foreign sovereignty-)
55. But cf RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(e)-(f) (1987) (claiming that reasonableness of extraterntonal exercise of junsdiction depends. m part.
on importance of regulation to international system and extent to which regulation is consistent with
international system's traditions).
56. See Koh, supra note 53. at 2409-34 (tracing this pattern in context of recent Haitian refugee
crisis).
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In a series of opinions during his last decade on the Court, Justice
Blackmun challenged each of these guiding tenets. His dissent in Regan v.
Wald contested the first, expressing skepticism about overblown claims of
executive power in foreign affairs in the face of detailed legislative
commands. 7 His dissent in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. recognized
rules of statutory and treaty construction as powerful restraints upon executive
action, construing those rules in context to effectuate the underlying purpose
of negotiated commitments.58  In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth59 and Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale v. United
States District Court,6" Blackmun recognized international comity as "not just
a vague political concern favoring international cooperation when it is in our
interest to do so. Rather it is a principle under which judicial decisions reflect
the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and good will."' 6' Finally, in those
same two cases, Blackmun looked beyond the United States' immediate
interests to the "mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning
international legal regime. '62 He urged judges to
consider if there is a course that furthers, rather than impedes, the
development of an ordered international system. A functioning system
for solving disputes across borders serves many values, among them
predictability, fairness, ease of commercial interactions, and "stability
through satisfaction of mutual expectations." These interests are
common to all nations, including the United States.
63
57. 468 U.S. 222, 255 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court's construction "loses all
sight of the general legislative purpose of the [statute] and the clear legislative intent behind the ... clause"
in question); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2568 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("What is extraordinary in this case is that the Executive, in disregard of the law, would take
to the seas to intercept fleeing refugees and force them back to their persecutors-and that the Court would
strain to sanction that conduct."). Blackmun has also been notable for his refusal to infer from
congressional silence permission for state governments to act in foreign affairs. See, e.g.. Itel Containers
Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 113 S. Ct. 1095, 1110 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Wardair Canada Inc.
v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 18 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. 113 S. Ct. at 2568 ("The Convention ... constitutes the backdrop against which the statute must
be understood."); see also Blackmun, supra note 45, at 41 (discussing United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992)) ("The Supreme Court, it seems to me, thus construed the treaty to permit the
precise result that the document was drafted to forbid.").
59. 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (upholding international arbitrability of antitrust claim).
60. 482 U.S. 522, 547 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (examining
exclusivity of Hague Evidence Convention).
61. Id. at 555; accord Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629 ("[Wle conclude that concerns of international
comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the
parties' agreement .... ).
62. Airospatiale. 482 U.S. at 555.
63. Id. at 567 (citation omitted). Similarly, in Mitsubishi, Blackmun argued:
As international trade has expanded in recent decades, so too has the use of international
arbitration to resolve disputes arising in the course of that trade .... If [international tribunals]
are to take a central place in the international legal order .... [lit will be necessary for national
courts to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy favoring
commercial arbitration.
473 U.S. at 638-39.
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Taken together, these Blackmun opinions sketch a compelling -counter-
vision" of law's role in an interdependent global order.' In that realm,
political stability depends on regimes of law, not just raw power. Within those
regimes, the United States is not the only relevant actor; U.S. officials act by
reference to shared, not simply local, norms;"5 and the Supreme Court
represents neither the final, nor the infallible, interpreter of what is lawful.'
By challenging the guiding tenets of the Court's global jurisprudence,
Blackmun painted a world of duties beyond borders, stable and predictable
commercial relations, well-functioning transnational dispute-resolution
systems,67 and judicial protection for human rights."5
Blackmun's fate is to be remembered as the judge who wrote Roe v.
Wade. But if all we remember him for is Roe, then he would have fooled us
again. For Harry Blackmun wrote about much more than just abortion.
Through decades of growth and change, he recast his judicial mission from
deferring to insiders to defending outsiders. He broke out of the parochialism
of a Court that too often looks inward, to protect the needs of those forgotten
in the "world out there." a world that lies both within and without our borders.
64. See ALl Address. supra note 21. at 59 ("We are all in this together, and ho% 'ulnerable %%c all
are as we see the turmoil and the struggle all over the world, including our own counir) "1
65. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council. Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549. 2568 (Blackmun. J . disenting) ("The
ltreaty's] terms are unambiguous. Vulnerable refugees shall not be returned."). Blackmun. supra note 45.
at 48 ("If the substance of the Eighth Amendment is to turn on the cvolv.ing standards of decency' of the
civilized world, there can be no justification for limiting judicial inquiry to the opinion% of the United
States.").
66. See Blackmun, supra note 45, at 42 ("We perhaps can take some comfort in the fact that although
the Supreme Court is the highest court in the land. its rulings ar not necessarily the final sord on
questions of international law.").
67. In Mitsubishi, for example, Blackmun wrote:
The controversies that international arbitral institutions are called upon to resole ltase imcreased
in diversity as well as in complexity. Yet the potential of these tribunals for efficient disposition
of legal disagreements arising from commercial relations has not yet been tested If the) are to
take a central place in the international legal order, national courts %%ill need to "shake off the
old judicial hostility to arbitration." and also their customary and understandable unwillingness
to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic law to a foreign or transnational tribunal
473 U.S. at 639 (citations omitted); see also id. at 639 n.21 ("The utility of the Consention in promoting
the process of international commercial arbitration depends upon the willingness of national courts to let
go of matters they normally would think of as their own.").
68. In Haitian Centers Council, for example. B lackmun's lone protest against our go eirnent"t forced
return of Haitian refugees reflected his solicitude for aliens, his skepticism about unchecked presidential
discretion in foreign affairs, and his determination to construe international human rights norms in light of
the needs of a well-ordered international system. Cf. Campbell s Wood. 114 S Ct- 2125, 2125 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that state-sponsored hanging %iolates evolving
standards of decency): United States v. Verdugo-Urqutdez. 494 U.S. 259. 297 (1990) (Blackmun. J.
dissenting) ("[Wlhen a foreign national is held accountable for purported violations of United States
criminal laws, he has effectively been treated as one of 'the governed' and therefore is entitled to Fourth
Amendment protections."). To the extent that Justice Blackmun believes that foreign and transnational
tribunals can apply international law standards to protect individual rights ceen when the U S Supreme
Court will not, his reasoning parallels that of Justice Brennan's famous article regarding the role of state
courts as protectors of fundamental liberties. See William J Brennan. Jr. State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977)
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